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LITIGATION MALPRACTICE – REPRESENTATION IN NON-ADVERSARIAL 
PARTS OF PROCEEDINGS 
 
Summary 
 
Appeal from a district court judgment in a legal malpractice action claiming the 
statute of limitations to file suit had not run and that the litigation-tolling rule should 
apply. The Court determined that McDonald Carano Wilson LLP did not represent 
appellant during litigation and litigation-tolling rule did not apply. The Court affirmed the 
district court's judgment. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 An attorney's alleged negligence in representing a creditor during the non-
adversarial parts of a bankruptcy proceeding does not cause the litigation-tolling rule 
under Hewitt to apply. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
Appellant, Sierra International, Inc. (“Sierra”), defaulted on a promissory note and 
lease with Moon, the president and principal shareholder of Patterson Laboratories, Inc. 
(PLI). Sierra filed a Chapter 7 voluntary petition in bankruptcy court in 2001, and 
appellants hired respondent McDonald Carano Wilson LLP (“MCW”) in July 2002 to 
represent them in Sierra's bankruptcy action. 
 
In the bankruptcy case, allegedly, pursuant to a stipulation by the attorneys and 
trustee, the lease of the Goodyear facility was terminated, and PLI was permitted to take 
possession of the collateral. MCW's representation of appellants ended in February 2003. 
On October 21, 2008, the bankruptcy court entered its final decree and closed Sierra's 
bankruptcy case. 
 
Meanwhile, on November 3, 2006, appellants filed an action against MCW, 
alleging professional negligence, breach of contract, and vicarious liability arising from 
its representation of appellants in Sierra's bankruptcy action. In 2008, the district court 
dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, appellants appealed, and this court affirmed. 
 
On October 20, 2010, appellants filed a second action against MCW, reasserting 
the same claims. MCW filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to NRCP 
12(b)(5), arguing that the case was time-barred under the applicable statute of 
limitations,2 which the district court granted. The district court rejected February 17, 
2009 and October 21, 2008, as the accrual dates. It held that November 3, 2006, was the 
appropriate accrual date because appellants knew the material facts that made up their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 By David Rothenberg, Senior Staff Member, Nevada Law Journal. 
2 NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.207(1) 
malpractice action as early as that date. This appeal followed. 
 
Discussion 
 
The district court did not err by granting MCW's motion to dismiss based 
upon NRS 11.207(1) 
 
NRS 11.207(1) allows a plaintiff to bring a claim within two years after plaintiff 
discovered or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the material 
facts, which constitutes the cause of action. However, the Court held in Hewitt v. Allen3 
that a malpractice action does not accrue while an appeal from the adverse ruling is 
pending. 
 
Non-adversarial bankruptcy proceedings do not constitute litigation 
for purposes of the litigation malpractice tolling rule 
 
The Court reviewed the Arizona case Cannon v. Hirsch 4 for relevance. In 
Cannon, an attorney was retained to protect a creditor's interests in a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy action. Afterwards, the creditor filed a complaint against the attorney for 
malpractice during the representation. On appeal, the Cannon court recognized that 
bankruptcy proceedings might contain both adversarial and non-adversarial portions and 
any alleged negligence during non-adversarial portions of bankruptcy proceedings does 
not occur in the course of 'litigation,' as that term is used for purposes of the accrual of an 
attorney malpractice action.5 The court created a bright-line test to distinguish between 
the non-adversarial and adversarial portions of a bankruptcy proceeding: adversarial 
proceedings begin when a creditor files a complaint in a bankruptcy action.6 
 
The Court adopted and applied the Cannon court's analysis and concluded that 
Sierra's bankruptcy action did not constitute an adversarial proceeding. MCW’s rejection 
of the unexpired lease was resolved by stipulation of the parties and no adversarial 
proceeding was filed. Therefore, the proceedings were non-adversarial and constitute an 
uncontested matter. Furthermore, the Court determined that appellants' reliance upon 
Guillot v. Smith7 was misplaced. Guillot was based on a presumption of the attorney's 
continued representation of the client.8 However, MCW only represented appellants in 
Sierra's bankruptcy action from July 2002 to February 2003. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court affirmed the district court’s judgment granting MCW's motion to 
dismiss pursuant to NRS11.207(1). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 118 Nev. at 221, 43 P.3d at 348. 
4 213 P.3d 320 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). 
5 Id. at 325, 327–28. 
6 Id. at 328 (citing Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7003 ("Commencement of Adversary Proceeding"). 
7 998 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. App. 1999). 
8 Id. at 632–33.	  
